Their open nature and the absence of dedicated routers mean that MANETs are especially vulnerable to routing attacks [1] [2] . The wormhole attack [3] is one of the most severe MANET routing threats since it is relatively easy to launch, difficult to detect, and yet can cause significant communications disruption. Two collaborating malicious nodes create a fictive shortcut link in the network by forwarding routing packets to each other with the intention to attract more data packets to traverse the wormhole link. Once the wormhole has been successfully established, the malicious nodes can disrupt network operation by either dropping packets or launching more pernicious attacks, such as eavesdropping and packet sniffing.
A wormhole attack can be launched in either hidden mode (HM) or participation mode (PM) [4] . In the former, malicious nodes capture and forward routing packets to each other without modifying the actual packets, so the wormhole nodes never appear in routing tables. In contrast, PM nodes process routing packets as any pair of legitimate nodes and therefore appear in a wormhole infected route as two contiguous nodes.
The malicious nodes can forward routing packets to each other using either an in-band (I-B) or out-of-band (O-B) wormhole link. An I-B link tunnels packets between the malicious nodes via genuine network nodes, while an O-B link is more complex because it requires an external communication channel, i.e. network cable or directional antenna, to establish a direct link between the wormhole nodes.
Designing effective robust wormhole detection schemes means considering all four modes with each mandating different requirements upon the detection mechanism. While various detection strategies have been proposed in [3] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , most solutions have some recurring limitations including the inability to detect all wormhole types, the requirement for dedicated hardware, reliance on particular MANET environments, and imposing high computational overheads and/or bandwidth loads upon the network.
Several wormhole attack detection schemes are based on analysing round trip time (RTT) per hop, including delay per hop indication (DelPHI) [6] , wormhole attack prevention (WAP) [7] , and transmission time based mechanism (TTM) [8] . A route with an unrealistically high RTT per hop count (HC) or between any two successive hops is suspected to be wormhole infected. RTT-based approaches offer low overhead solutions in terms of hardware, computation, and throughput, but have the limitation that variations in a node's packet processing time must be small. In a real MANET, nodes can exhibit high packet processing time variations resulting in low wormhole detection rates and high false positive (FP) rates for RTT-based solutions, as is theoretically proven in [9] and in [10] .
Alternative approaches like wormhole attack detection using hop latency and adjoining (WAD-HLA) node analysis [11] and neighbor probe acknowledge (NPA) [12] improve the detection performance of RTT-based methods by measuring the RTT between two nodes multiple times and using statistics to determine the RTT value. This correlates better with the route distance between two hops, though such strategies tend to lead to increased network traffic loads.
Another approach [9, 10, 13] for improving the distance estimation accuracy between nodes is to subtract the packet processing times from RTT measurements, resulting in the air packet traversal time (PTT). The PTT of a route reflects better than RTT the route distance between two nodes. In [9] , a modified version of TTM (M-TTM) was proposed where every node on a route measures the RTT between itself and the next hop. The measured RTT is then compared with the expected RTT, which is estimated by measuring the packet processing times of the route request (RREQ) and route reply (RREP) packets at the next hop and thereafter adding the maximum PTT (PTTMAX). If the measured RTT between two nodes is significantly higher than the expected RTT, then a wormhole is suspected.
While M-TTM provides good detection performance under certain conditions, it has a number of limitations. Firstly, each node along a route must add four different timestamps to every routing packet to reflect the specific times incurred in receiving and forwarding RREQ and RREP packets. The assumptions underpinning how the expected RTT is determined are also unrealistic since in [9] PTTMAX is presumed to be 1µs which corresponds to a distance of about 300m. In a real network, the PTTMAX of a node will be dependent on both its hardware and surroundings, since in a line-of-sight (LOS) link PTTMAX will be much higher than when there are obstacles between nodes. Furthermore, applying a set 2ms threshold for the maximum difference between the measured and expected RTT values means that it cannot detect all wormhole types. For instance, if the MANET has a PM O-B wormhole, then the PTT between the malicious nodes is short and is the only extra delay incurred.
Traversal time and hop count analysis (TTHCA) [10] is a recent wormhole detection technique designed as a security extension to the ad hoc on demand distance vector (AODV) [14] routing protocol and is lightweight in terms of both network overheads and computational complexity. It combines the benefits of RTT-based approaches and HC analysis [15] to provide improved detection for all wormhole types under a multiplicity of network scenarios. TTHCA applies a fixed threshold R/S, where R is the maximum radio range per node and S is signal propagation speed (i.e. 3 • 10 8 m/s), for the maximum permissible PTT/HC. In a homogeneous MANET where all nodes are in LOS, TTHCA is able to detect PM O-B wormholes. However, in real MANETs nodes usually have different hardware and encounter obstacles like walls and buildings. This causes fluctuations in the radio coverage of nodes. For both PM I-B and HM O-B/I-B wormholes, radio coverage variations do not affect wormhole detection performance of TTHCA, because such wormhole links incur long delays. However, for a fast-link PM O-B wormhole TTHCA detection rate is dependent on both radio coverage variation and wormhole length. See [10] for a critical evaluation of TTHCA.
The main limitation of TTHCA is its use of a rigid threshold in the PTT/HC analysis, so to relax this constraint, this paper introduces an extended flexible detection technique called traversal time per hop analysis (TTpHA). This uses TTHCA as its kernel and by using a dynamic threshold for the maximum permissible PTT value for each hop, TTpHA can readily adapt to prevailing network conditions and can handle variable node radio ranges and different environments, while affording superior detection accuracy.
A key factor in detecting PM O-B wormholes with PTTbased detection techniques, including TTpHA, TTHCA and M-TTM, is the accuracy of the timestamps generated for incoming and outgoing routing packets. For I-B and/or HM wormholes this is though not an issue due to their long link delays. This paper includes an analysis of the requirements on the timestamp resolution (TR) for TTpHA and provides comparative simulation results between TTpHA and M-TTM for PM O-B wormhole attack detection performance for different TR values and network conditions. The impact of node mobility during the route discovery procedure on TTpHA and M-TTM wormhole attack detection performance is also evaluated.
As it in [10] was shown that I-B and HM wormholes can be successfully detected by both TTHCA and TTpHA (since it is an extension of TTHCA) and since TR and radio coverage variabilities are not critical for such wormholes, the focus of this paper turns to the challenging PM O-B wormhole detection. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The TTpHA algorithm is introduced in Section II. Simulation experiments and a comparative results analysis of TTpHA with the original TTHCA algorithm and M-TTM are then presented in Section III, with some concluding comments being given in Section IV.
II. THE PACKET TRAVERSAL TIME PER HOP ANALYSIS ALGORITHM
TTpHA is a significant extension to the TTHCA algorithm [10] , embracing two new features. TTpHA measures and analyses PTT for each successive hop (PTTi,i+1) rather than PTT/HC to provide more accurate wormhole attack detection, and uses a dynamic threshold for the maximum permissible PTTi,i+1 to automatically adapt to variable radio ranges and network environments. In this section, the TTpHA route discovery procedure to obtain PTTi,i+1 calculations is presented before describing and critically analyzing the dynamic threshold mechanism.
A. TTpHA Extended AODV Route Discovery Procedure
TTpHA extends the AODV route discovery procedure analogously to TTHCA [10] with routing packet processing time (∆Ti) measurements at all destination and intermediate nodes where ∆Ti is the sum of the AODV RREQ and RREP packet (RREQAODV and RREPAODV) processing times at node i (∆Ti={∆TRREQ}i+{∆TRREP}i). To render PTTi,i+1 calculations, TTpHA measures PTT between each intermediate and the destination node (PTTi) in a similar way as route PTT measurements are performed in TTHCA. Each PTTi is delivered to the source node as a separate parameter of a new RREP packet (RREPTTpHA) together with the sum of all ∆Ti values (∆TTOT). To achieve high resolution timestamps, the ∆Ti measurements must be performed at the physical layer while routing packets are processed at the network layer. For this reason, the ∆TTOT parameter and the PTTi values cannot be simply added to RREPAODV as is proposed in [10] . The complete TTpHA extended AODV route discovery procedure is illustrated in Fig.  1 , where node 1, 2 and 3 are the source, intermediate, and destination nodes respectively, {TRREQr}i and {TRREQs}i are the timestamps generated when receiving and sending the first bit of RREQAODV at node i, while {TRREPr}i and {TRREPs}i are the corresponding RREPAODV timestamps. Upon receiving RREPAODV and RREPTTpHA at the end of a route discovery procedure, the source node calculates each PTTi,i+1 from , +1 =  if node i+1 is the destination node, otherwise
is then inserted as an element of a vector V which is ranked in ascending order. V is used to determine a dynamic threshold Θ for the maximum permissible PTTi,i+1 of the route. If nodes i and i+1 form a PM wormhole, then PTTi,i+1 at node i will be larger than any healthy PTTi,i+1. Thus, the wormhole link is detected if VHC > Θ. The complete TTpHA algorithm at the source node is shown in Fig. 2 , where it is assumed there is only one wormhole link per route. To detect multiple wormhole links, all Vi (1 ≤ i ≤ HC) must be separately evaluated.
B. Dynamic Threshold Θ
To successfully identify the PTTi,i+1 of a wormhole link it must be compared with a threshold value Θ that is considered to be the upper bound for healthy PTTi,i+1 values. Automatic adaption to variable network environments and diverse node hardware requires dynamic calculation of Θ. To achieve this, an outlier detection technique, such as Grubb's test [16] , the box plot method [17] , or Dixon's Q-test [18] is usable to identify the wormhole link PTTi,i+1, which is typically significantly higher than any healthy PTTi,i+1. To determine Θ, the Q-test was chosen because it is specifically designed for small sample numbers n, typically 3 ≤ n ≤ 10, while in analyzing all PTTi,i+1 values of a route n = HC. Considering larger sample numbers [19] , it is a pragmatic design assumption that n≤30, since at higher values communicating nodes will be located unrealistically long distances apart and a route will incur high delays. The threshold Θ is calculated from the ranked V values as
where Vn-1 is the second largest PTTi,i+1 value, V1 is the smallest value, and QC is the critical Q value for a chosen confidence level α defined in [20] . If the route HC < 3, then (3) cannot be used. However, since the minimum HC of a PM wormhole infected route is 3, it is reasonable to apply the TTHCA [10] fixed threshold by defining Θ = . A wormhole is then suspected if
where Vn is the largest PTTi,i+1 value.
The choice of parameter α affords a useful design trade-off mechanism between wormhole detection and FP rates. A high α means low FP rates, but a concomitantly lower wormhole detection probability. Conversely, a low α increases the probability of detecting a wormhole, but with a higher FP rate. A confidence level α=0.9 was empirically determined for all the ensuing simulations as it represents the best design choice from a detection perspective.
A critical analysis of how key TTpHA factors including radio range variability, TR, node mobility, and time measurement tampering influence the wormhole detection capability of Θ will now be presented.
1) Radio Range Variability
If the route HC ≥ 3, then (3) is applied to calculate Θ. As Θ is automatically determined from PTTi,i+1 values in V, the TTpHA wormhole detection performance is dependent not only on the specific PTTi,i+1 of the wormhole link, but on the variability of all other PTTi,i+1 values. The maximum permissible variability which can still guarantee 100% detection of PM O-B wormholes is defined in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1:
If Vn = PTTi,i+1 of a wormhole link, then it will always be detected provided the lowest PTTi,i+1 value V1 fulfils the following condition:
where x defines the smallest permissible distance between two successive nodes (ri,i+1) in relation to the length of the wormhole link (rwh). The x value is calculated from:
for the worst case scenario Vn-1= , i.e. largest ri,i+1=R.
Proof: If Vn-1 = and V1 ≥ ℎ then from (3) Θ ≤ ℎ and thus the wormhole is detected. Correspondingly, if V1 < ℎ then Θ > ℎ and the wormhole will not be detected. ■
In a homogeneous LOS MANET environment ri,i+1 can lie within the range [0, R]. This means that there is a risk that a PM O-B wormhole goes undetected if both the wormhole link and the route are short. The average ri,i+1 is though in such environments in practice close to R while in non-LOS environments physical obstacles and differences in antenna capabilities lead to a higher variability in ri,i+1 since the momentary radio range (Ri) at many nodes is less than R. If the maximum radio coverage of a specific node in a non-LOS environment is Ri, then ri,i+1 is bounded by , +1 + +1, +2 > min { , +1 }
(7) cannot be false, since then the 2-hop neighbor of node i would still lie within radio range and become a direct 1-hop neighbor. The condition in (7) means, that a short route infected by a short PM O-B wormhole will have a greater likelihood of going undetected than in a homogenous LOS environment.
2) Timestamp Resolution (TR)
To calculate ∆Ti in TTpHA, each intermediate node creates four timestamps ({TRREQr}i, {TRREQs}i, {TRREPr}i, and {TRREPs}i) and the destination node two ({TRREQr}i and {TRREPs}i). The source node creates two timestamps to calculate route RTT ({TRREQs}i and {TRREPr}i). TR causes for each created timestamp a measurement error ETR, 0≤ ETR<TR. The value of each generated timestamp can therefore be expressed as TA+ETR where TA is the actual time.
Each PTTi,i+1 is calculated as 

Using (8) and (9), it can be concluded that a PM O-B wormhole will always be detected provided the following condition is upheld:
3) Mobility Node mobility during the route discovery procedure will impact on a measured PTTi,i+1 value in the sense, that it will not correspond exactly to the ri,i+1 value when node i sends a RREQ or receives the RREP, unless nodes i and i+1 are moving in the same direction with exactly the same speed. PTTi,i+1 will still represent a valid ri,i+1 within the bound specified by (7), because even though two successive nodes on a route are moving they cannot communicate if ri,i+1>Ri. For this reason wormhole attack detection performance will not be affected.
4) Time Measurement Tampering
Wormhole nodes can potentially tamper with PTTi and ∆Ti values in order to prevent the PTTi,i+1 of a wormhole link from being > θ. A successful time measurement tampering attack is though challenging to realize in practice since the malicious nodes must be aware of the exact delay of the wormhole link, otherwise the attack may easily result in either PTTi,i+1 < 0 or a PTTi,i+1 still being < θ. The prevailing conditions for a time measurement tampering attack on TTHCA to succeed has been formally analyzed and an extension for time measurement tampering detection for PM I-B wormholes has been proposed in [21] . While this extension can be applied in TTpHA, time measurement tampering attacks for PM O-B wormholes can be detected for instance by permitting third party neighboring nodes to collaborate promiscuously to validate time measurements. A future research proposal is thus to investigate a distributed time measurement tampering detection strategy.
III. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
The wormhole and FP detection performance for different wormhole lengths, Ri variations, and TR values was analyzed in a series of simulation experiments. The MANET simulation environments in these experiments were created in ns-2 [22] for packet propagation speed S=3•10 8 m/s and the TwoRayGround [23] propagation model. All network nodes except the wormhole nodes were assigned new random positions for each simulation run. For wormhole detection evaluation two wormhole nodes were strategically placed in the center of the simulation environment, a specific distance rwh from each other, to disrupt as much network traffic as possible from all network nodes. The shortest wormhole length tested was rwh = 3R, i.e. 3 hops, since in the simulation environment the amount of network traffic attracted in shorter wormholes is minimal. The wormhole link delay for an O-B link was defined as S/rwh, which corresponds to the use of a directional antenna. During the FP detection evaluations the simulation environment was wormhole free. TTHCA [10] and M-TTM [9] were used as comparators since TTpHA is based on TTHCA and uses a similar packet delay per hop analysis scheme to that employed in M-TTM. The 2ms fixed threshold for the maximum permissible difference between the measured and expected RTT values defined in [9] was omitted due to its impropriety for PM O-B wormhole detection. Hence, a wormhole is detected if any measured RTT > expected RTT.
In the experiments, two MANET scenarios are considered, i.e. an indoor and an outdoor environment, for which the respective parameter settings are shown in Table 1 . In both environments it is assumed that all network nodes use IEEE 802.11n compliant wireless hardware, which determines the approximate R values in Table 1 . The outdoor environment size and number of nodes N are defined as in [15] while the indoor environment dimensions reflect a large building. In a real MANET, the momentary radio range Ri will also be dependent on the antenna used and node surroundings, e.g. in an indoor environment containing obstructions like walls Ri is smaller than in a LOS environment. A random Ri distance value in the range min(Ri)≤ Ri≤ R is introduced. The results from these simulation experiments are presented in the following subsections. 
A. Variable Radio Range
In the first set of experiments, the comparative wormhole detection performance of TTpHA, TTHCA, and M-TTM was evaluated for different Ri variability levels and wormhole lengths. The results shown in Fig. 3 , reveal that for TTpHA, radio range variability has no significant impact on the wormhole detection rate as >90% of the wormhole infected routes were detected outdoors and > 80% indoors for all tested Ri variations. This contrasts to TTHCA, where the combination of a short wormhole and high radio range variability substantially decreased the detection rate.
In the outdoor environment, TTpHA wormhole detection rate tended to slightly drop with increased Ri variability. For example, the detection rate of the 3-hop wormhole was approximately 95% for min(Ri)=R and 90% for min(Ri)=0.2R. The opposite trend was observed for the indoor environment, with 82% detection rate for the 3-hop wormhole case when min(Ri)=R and 100% when min(Ri)=0.2R. The reason is that the route HC indoors was often <5 when min(Ri)=R which according to Lemma 1 means there is a risk that the condition in (5) is not upheld. The (5) condition has a significantly higher probability of being upheld when min(Ri)=0.2R, for which the average route HC is significantly higher. Outdoors the average route HC was higher than indoors and therefore (5) was mostly upheld even for min(Ri)=R.
Wormhole detection performance of TTHCA fails dramatically for min(Ri)<R because it is based on the average PTT/HC. For Ri < R the average ri,i+1 is low compared to R and the condition PTT/HC > R/S [10] is not upheld. M-TTM, on the other hand, provided 100% detection of all wormholes outdoors and of all 5-hop wormholes indoors. However, no wormholes shorter than 5 hops were detected indoors. The reason is that M-TTM assumes PTTMAX=1µs for the expected RTTi,i+1 and a wormhole is suspected if a measured RTTi,i+1>expected RTTi,i+1. A wormhole link is therefore only detected if rwh > 1µ . A cursory review of the results reveals that TTpHA is much more flexible, since it automatically adjusts its threshold to the prevailing environment, while M-TTM and TTHCA are only appropriate to outdoor environments. In terms of the corresponding FP rates, it was observed that the Ri variability level impacts on the performance of TTpHA since outdoors, the FP rate was just 4% when R≤ Ri≤ R, but 10% when 0.2R≤ Ri≤ R. The corresponding FP rates indoors were marginally lower, at 2% and 8% respectively. These results can be reduced by choosing a higher confidence value α for the threshold. However, this will decrease wormhole detection rates. From a wormhole detection perspective, a FP rate of up to 10% is still a laudable outcome considering the significant detection improvement achieved by TTpHA compared to both TTHCA and M-TTM. Furthermore, a higher FP rate does not prevent communication with a destination node, but the shortest route might be disabled.
It needs to be stressed that the fixed threshold used in TTHCA and PTTMAX in M-TTM could be manually adjusted to the indoor environment to provide similar detection performance to that achieved for the outdoor environment. However, since this would involve decreasing these values, there would be a significantly higher FP detection rate outdoors. This highlights a key advantage of TTpHA in its ability to automatically adjust to its environment and move seamlessly between different situations without the need for any manual parameter adjustment.
These results are based on the assumption that each timestamp used in all three detection techniques can be generated with a 1ns measurement accuracy. This is not a wholly realistic assumption for all constituent MANET hardware even if TR values as good as 1 ns can be achieved with currently available timestamping hardware [24] [25] . Therefore, the next section presents a performance insight into relaxing this assumption.
B. Time Measurement Accuracy
The next series of experiments analyzed the requirements imposed upon wireless interface hardware regarding the tolerances to TR required to monitor and process in-coming and out-going routing packets. Again different wormhole lengths were used and the performance of TTpHA and M-TTM was tested across a TR range from 1ns to 1µs. For example, TR=10ns means that every node is capable of both detecting and timestamping reception or transmission of a routing packet every 10ns. In these experiments, a radio range variability of 0.2R≤ Ri≤ R was used to reflect a realistic mixture of node hardware and obstacles. Due to its overall poor wormhole detection performance in highly variable radio range scenarios, TTHCA was not included as a comparator in this particular results analysis.
The results in Fig. 4 show that the TTpHA wormhole detection performance is not significantly decreased even when TR at each node is only 100ns, as more than 90% of all tested wormholes were detected. The reason for this is obvious in the outdoor scenario, because the maximum allowable TR value in (11) >100ns when the route HC ≥ 5 and rwh=750m and the majority of the obtained wormhole infected routes had more than 5 hops. The corresponding maximum tolerable TR for the indoor environment does not exceed 100ns before the route HC≥9. However, each PTTi,i+1 value can vary within the bounds in (9) , and since these can only be compromised in exceptional circumstances, wormhole detection performance is not significantly lowered despite a large proportion of infected routes being shorter than 9 hops. Even for TR=1µs, TTpHA still provides good performance in the outdoor environment scenario with a detection rate of 90% for all wormholes. For the indoor environment, the wormhole detection rate becomes heavily degraded when TR=1µs with a detection rate of only 30…50%. The reason is that TR is in fact larger than any , +1 and ℎ . It is thus in practice impossible to discern a healthy link from a wormhole infected link, as is also indicated by the corresponding FP rate (~32%) being akin to the detection rate.
When the TR=1µs, M-TTM interestingly detected nearly 30% of the 3-hop wormholes and up to 50% of the 4-hop wormholes in the indoor environment even though for both wormhole lengths ℎ <PTTMAX. The reason for this is that (PTTMAX -ℎ )<TR and as a result ETR often causes a measured wormhole link PTTi,i+1 to be >PTTMAX.. While these are still poor results, the detection rate of the 5 HC wormhole was satisfactory as more than 70% of the wormholes were detected compared to 50% for TTpHA. However, when cognizance is taken of the overall wormhole detection performance, TTpHA is noticeably superior, since it detects all wormholes types with greater flexibility than M-TTM at a consistently high rate both indoors and outdoors even when TR=100ns, while M-TTM was unable to detect indoor 3-hop and 4-hop wormholes at all. While the FP rate tends to increase for TTpHA with increasing TR values, the rate never exceeds 13% when TR≤100ns in either of the tested environments. This is a satisfactory outcome since there still exists an 87% probability of finding the shortest route between the source and destination nodes. When TR=1µs the FP rates for the outdoor and the indoor environments are 37% and 32% respectively, which although high is still acceptable since on average < 2 healthy routes need to be requested and checked to find a useful route. TTpHA is significantly more flexible than related PTT-based solutions, including TTHCA and M-TTM, since it employs a dynamic threshold for the maximum permissible PTT between two legitimate nodes for adaption to prevailing MANET conditions and variable radio ranges. Critical simulation results evaluations showed that TTpHA provided accurate wormhole detection performance in both indoor and outdoor environments while the comparators, TTHCA and M-TTM, were only applicable in the outdoor environment without manual adjustments of their fixed thresholds. The results also indicated that in outdoor environments with long radio ranges, TTpHA can be implemented using low timestamp resolution off-theshelf wireless hardware, while providing consistently high wormhole detection rates. Concomitantly, the costs in terms of false positive rates and the corresponding computational and network overheads remain pragmatically low.
